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Abstract—Fog computing, a non-trivial extension of cloud 
computing to the edge of the network, has great advantage in 
providing services with a lower latency. In smart grid, the 
application of fog computing can greatly facilitate the collection 
of consumer’s fine-grained energy consumption data, which can 
then be used to draw the load curve and develop a plan or model 
for power generation. However, such data may also reveal 
customer’s daily activities. Non-intrusive load monitoring 
(NILM) can monitor an electrical circuit that powers a number 
of appliances switching on and off independently. If an adversary 
analyzes the meter readings together with the data measured by 
an NILM device, the customer’s privacy will be disclosed. In this 
paper, we propose an effective privacy-preserving scheme for 
electric load monitoring, which can guarantee differential 
privacy of data disclosure in smart grid. In the proposed scheme, 
an energy consumption behavior model based on Factorial 
Hidden Markov Model (FHMM) is established. In addition, noise 
is added to the behavior parameter, which is different from the 
traditional methods that usually add noise to the energy 
consumption data. The analysis shows that the proposed scheme 
can get a better trade-off between utility and privacy compared 
with other popular methods. 
Keywords—Fog computing; Differential Privacy; Internet of 
Things; Non-intrusive Load Monitoring; Smart Grid 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the support of emerging information technologies 
like the Internet of Things (IoT), fog computing, and cloud 
computing, smart grid has become increasingly intelligent and 
efficient [1-3]. As shown in Figure.1, in smart grid, IoT 
devices have been widely used for data collection purposes, 
such as the electricity consumption information gathering, the 
transmission line monitoring, and the transformer substation 
monitoring [4, 5]. The data collected by IoT devices are 
aggregated by the fog nodes that in the form of gateways or 
data aggregators with on-board computing capabilities; then 
the aggregated data are transferred to the control center for 
further analysis. For instance, in the electricity consumption 
information gathering scenario, to optimize the energy 
utilization, lots of smart meters (SM) installed at users’ 
households are connected to the communication network. 
They can send their power consumption data to the control 
center via the fog layer comprised of multiple aggregators at a 
fine granularity [6]. 
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Figure.1 Fog computing enabled data collection in smart grid 
However, accurately collecting user data always induces 
privacy and security issues as studied in [14,15,32,39]. The 
fine-grained energy consumption data collected by smart 
meters may disclose the sensitive information regarding the 
power consumption patterns of the household appliances 
which raises serious concerns about the user’s privacy [7]. As 
shown in Figure.2, non-intrusive appliance load monitoring 
(NILM) is an advanced power signature analysis tool, which is 
often used to break down the aggregate energy consumption 
data into individual appliances [8]. Given a user’s load profile, 
an adversary can track the states (ON or OFF) of all 
appliances with NILM. Based on the extracted device-level 
energy consumption data, the adversary can further infer lots 
of privacy-sensitive information about the user’s habits and 
behaviors. For example, the adversary can figure out whether 
there is nobody at home in a specific period of time, when the 
users go to bed and get up, when the users leave for work and 
so on. Therefore, users require a privacy-friendly scheme to 
protect such privacy-sensitive information.  
In fact, there is a significant body of work analyzing the 
users’ privacy-preservation [9-13]. The major privacy-
preserving solutions can be classified into homomorphic 
encryption [42] [43], flattening energy signatures by battery-
based load hiding (BLH) [16-21] and noise addition [22-24]. 
However, schemes based on homomorphic encryption have 
huge computational cost and require a third party for key 
distribution and management [24]. These solutions are 
infeasible when used in a wider area with a large number of 
meters. However, the credibility of the third party is difficult to 
guarantee. The privacy-preserving schemes based on 
rechargeable battery are limited to the battery capacity. 
Moreover, the charging and discharging of the household 
battery may conflict with the user’s economic interest [25].  
Installing batteries and equipment in each home is infeasible. 
Zhao [1] adopts the BLH method to preserve user’s privacy-
sensitive information and uses differential privacy to measure 
the privacy-preserving performance. Noise addition is a 
common solution to provide differential privacy in which the 
outcome is not significantly affected by the removal or addition 
of single participants. 
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Figure.2 Non-intrusive appliance load monitor and user’s behavior privacy inference in smart grid 
Differential privacy is a better solution to the problem that 
existed methods such as k-anonymity are not sufficient to 
guarantee the anonymity of users. It requires that adding noise 
into the statistical results according to the sensitivity of each 
statistic when publishing the statistical results of the dataset. 
Therefore, whether or not the individual is in the dataset, the 
statistical result will not be affected. Differential privacy has 
been widely used in the fields of data statistics, information 
publishing, information searching and data mining, such as 
recommendation system, trace analysis and so on. 
However, most schemes based on differential privacy are 
mainly used to protect individual information for a statistical 
dataset, and existing schemes applying differential privacy to 
smart grid have several problems. For example, Barbosa [24] 
proposed a fundamental work on the application of differential 
privacy in smart grid. Nevertheless, the trade-off between 
utility and privacy is not very ideal in his scheme. Therefore, 
designing a reasonable data obfuscation algorithm by noise 
addition with a better trade-off between utility and privacy is 
the focus of our paper. We summarize our contributions as 
follows: 
1) Differing from traditional differential privacy schemes, 
we add noise into the switch states of each appliance to provide 
differential privacy. 
2) We use the basic properties of differential privacy to 
prove the effectiveness of our scheme in privacy-preservation.  
3) Motivated by the lower bound on utility which is called 
discriminant proposed by Kifer [25], we define a measurement 
to prove the better performance of our scheme in data-utility. 
4) We adopt the information theory of differential privacy 
proposed by Cuff [26] to measure the trade-off between utility 
and privacy in our scheme. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces the background and related work. In section III, our 
scheme is stated. In section IV, security analysis is given. In 
Section V, the performance of our scheme is evaluated. In 
Section VI, the paper is concluded. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. Differential privacy 
Dwork [27] has proposed the notion of differential 
privacy for general datasets and presented how to realize 
differential privacy by adding noise [28]. Using the infinite 
divisibility of Laplace Distribution to provide differential 
privacy in smart grid was discussed in [29] [30]. McSherry [31] 
studied the parallel composition and stable transformation in 
differential privacy. Kifer [25] analyzed the privacy-utility 
tradeoff and provided the metrics for data-utility. For the 
differential privacy in smart grid, Won J [44] analyzed the 
fault-tolerance during the data aggregation and used 
differential privacy to protect the future ciphertext. Shi [33] 
applied differential privacy to preserve the metering data 
during the data-aggregation. Several other papers (e.g., [34-
37]) have studied related security and network issues. 
1) Definition of differential privacy 
M is a randomized algorithm. For any datasets 
iD and
'D differing from at most one element, and all subsets of 
possible answers ( )S Range M , M satisfies   -differential 
privacy if both of the datasets satisfy the following condition: 
{ ( ) } { ( ') }r i rP M D S e P M D S
                               (1) 
The smaller the value of  is, the higher the degree of 
privacy-preservation is. 
2) Property1: Parallel Composition 
 
1 2, ... nM M M are different randomized algorithms with the 
privacy budgeting parameters
1 2, ... n   . Then, the combined 
algorithm
1 1 2 2( ( ), ( )... ( ))n nM M D M D M D provides (max )i -
differential privacy for the disjoint datasets
1 2, ... nD D D . 
3) Property2: Stable Transformations 
For any two databases E and F, we say T provides c-stable 
if it meets the following condition. 
| ( ) ( ) | | |T E T F c E F                                               (2)
 represents the XOR operation. If the privacy 
preserving mechanism M provides  -differential privacy and T 
is a c-stable transformation, the combination M  and T  
provides ( )c  - differential privacy. 
B. Hidden Markov Model 
In order to get a better trade-off between the privacy-
preservation and data-utility, Sanker [23] adopts the Hidden 
Markov Model (HMM) to model the state sequences of the 
appliances and generates the new energy consumption data 
based on the estimated state sequences and HMM. Besides, a 
noise following normal distribution is added to the new energy 
consumption data for further obfuscation. Based on the 
Factorial Hidden Markov Model (FHMM) [36], Kim [37] 
proposes a Conditional FHMM (CFHMM) to estimate the 
hidden states of each appliance. 
1) Hidden Markov Model 
Hidden Markov Model is a finite model that describes a 
probability distribution over sequential data. As shown in 
Figure.3 (a), X denotes the hidden states during different times, 
which can be viewed as a Markov Model and satisfies
1 1 1 1( | , ,... ) ( | )t t t t tP x x x x P x x   . Y denotes the observed 
states decided by the hidden states. There are three important 
parameters in HMM model: initial state probability distribution, 
transition matrix and emission matrix. 
The initial states probability distribution can be described 
as follows
( )
1{ | ( ),1 }
i
i i P x i N      . The transition 
matrix can be described as follows
( ) ( )
1{ ( | ),1 }
i i
t tA P x x i N   . Given a discrete or a 
continuous set, the emission matrix can be described as
( ) ( ){ ( | ),1 }i it tB P y x i N   , representing the probability of 
emission of observed state 
iy  when the hidden state is ix . 
2)  Factorial Hidden Markov Model 
Hidden Markov Model is a finite model that describes a 
probability distribution over sequential data. X denotes the 
hidden states during different times, which can be viewed as a 
Markov Model and satisfies 1 1 1 1
( | , ,... ) ( | )t t t t tP q q q q P q q   . 
Y denotes the observed states decided by the hidden states. 
There are three important parameters in HMM model: initial 
state probability distribution, transition matrix and emission 
matrix. 
As an extension of HMMs, FHMM is used to model 
multiple independent hidden state sequences in different times. 
The structure is shown in Figure.3 (b). 
iX  represents 
independent hidden states sequence. 
iY  represents 
corresponding observed states sequence. sumY  represents the 
aggregated observed states sequence. 
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(a) Hidden Markov Model 
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(b) Factorial Hidden Markov Model 
Figure.3 Sample graph of HMM and FHMM 
III.  OUR SCHEME 
Compared with traditional schemes, in this section, we 
proposed a differential privacy scheme which can get a better 
trade-off between utility and privacy. The key idea is to solve 
the problem of huge sensitivity through a specific 
transformation, achieve a novel result with a smaller noise and 
stronger privacy-preserving level. 
A. Notations 
In Table.1, the notations used in this paper are listed. 
Table.1 Notations in our scheme 
Acronym Descriptions 
 Privacy budget 
, 'D D   Adjacent datasets 
i  Initial probability of appliance i 
iA  Transition probability of appliance i 
iB  Emission probability of appliance i 
N The number of appliances 
iX  Hidden states sequence of appliance i 
iY  Observed states sequence of appliance i 
 Aggregate observed state sequence 
trainY  Training energy consumption data 
 Hidden state of appliance i at time t 
( ) 'i tx  
Obfuscated hidden state of appliance i at 
time t 
 Observed state of appliance i at time t 
( ) 'i ty  
Obfuscated observed state of appliance i at 
time t 
'
t
y  
The aggregation of the obfuscated 
observed state at time t 
 The set of parameters , ,A B   
 Global sensitivity 
 Local sensitivity 
 
B. Design goal 
Traditional differential privacy proposed the notion for 
general statistical data sets. But for smart grid, the object of 
the protection is not only statistical data. Before Barbosa, there 
is no well-accepted rigorous definition of privacy in the smart 
grid environment. Barbosa [24] described it as that a 
consumption profile is a set of appliances, we say profiles P1 
and P2 differ in at most one element if one is a proper subset 
of the other and the larger dataset profile contains just one 
additional appliance. 
Base on this definition, we have made fine-grained 
improvements. We say profiles D  and 'D  differing in at 
most one element if one is a proper subset of the other and the 
larger dataset profile contains just one state of an appliance. 
Instantiated by the notion of differential privacy proposed 
by Dwork [27] and Barbosa [24], we propose the notion of 
differential privacy for datasets of the behavior signatures. 
Therefore, the adversary learns the similar information when 
there is a difference of the behavior signatures.  
We call switch D and D' differing in at most one element 
adjacent datasets, if the differential element is an additional 
behavior signature. 
Definition.1. Adjacent datasets 
M is a randomized algorithm. M satisfies  -differential 
privacy if both of the datasets satisfy the following condition: 
{ ( ) } { ( ') }r i rP M D S e P M D S
                               (1) 
For all profiles D  and 'D   differing in at most one state 
of an appliance. 
Definition.2. Global sensitivity 
For a mapping :
kf D R , kR denotes a k-dimensional 
vector. D and 'D are an arbitrary pair of adjacent datasets. The 
global sensitivity of f is  
1
, '
|| ( ) (D') ||maxf
D D
GS f D f                                           (2) 
For all the D and D' differing in one appliance’s switch 
state.  
The design goals of the proposed scheme are given as 
follows. Inherited from Barbosa’s [24] design goals, our 
schemes focus on the following aspects: 
1) Enabling the calculation of the total consumption of a 
consumer over a period of time (e.g., monthly billing); 
2) Enabling the calculation of the total consumption of all 
consumers in a region at a certain instant of time; 
3) Avoiding the measurement of the instantaneous 
consumption of an individual consumer at a certain instant of 
time. 
Besides, we also propose two new design goals. 
1) The entropy of the final obfuscated data should not be 
far from the original data. 
2) There is no outlier in the final obfuscated load profile. 
Figure.4 is quoted from Acs’s scheme [30]. As shown in 
the obfuscated load profile, there are several values extremely 
lower than zero, which is against the common energy 
consumption behavior. We take these values as outliers. 
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(a) Original load profile 
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(b) Obfuscated load profile 
Figure.4 Load profiles of original and obfuscated data 
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Figure.5 The system model of our scheme 
C. System model  
We show the system model of our scheme in Figure.5 
and show the architecture in Figure.6. The load signature is 
extracted from the energy consumption data. Then, each 
appliance’s switch state related with the consumer’s behavior 
is estimated based on the FHMM. Differing from the 
traditional differential privacy schemes which add noise into 
active power data, we add noise into the consumer’s behaviors 
(the switch states of appliances) to implement the differential 
privacy. Then, the obfuscated energy consumption data is sent 
to the fog by smart meters. After processing the data with the 
fog computing nodes in groups, the aggregators will send the 
processed result to the cloud for further analysis. 
D. Appliance Modelling  
As we have analyzed before, the energy consumption 
behavior can be modeled by the FHMM, in which the 
aggregated active power sequence of the entire appliances is 
regarded as the observed state, and the switch state sequence 
of each appliance is regarded as the hidden state. To estimate 
the hidden state, we need to estimate the related parameters in 
FHMM first. 
We use H to denote the set of switch states 
1{ , ,... }H OFF ON ON . iON represents the kind of switch 
state in ON-state. The related parameters of appliance i in 
FHMM contain the initial probabilities
( )
1( )
i
i P x  , the 
conditional probabilities
( ) ( )
1( | )
i i
i t tA P x x   , and the emission 
probabilities
( ) ( )( | )i ii t tB P y x . To simplify the analysis, we 
use i to denote the set of parameters. 
Based on the related parameters of appliance i, we can 
calculate the initial probability i , the transition probability 
iA , the emission probability iB  and the conditional 
probability of switch state ( , | ,1 )iP Y X i N    as follows: 
( )
1
1 1
( )
N N
i
i
i i
P x 
 
    
( ) ( )
1
1 1
( | )
N N
i i
i t t
i i
A A P x x 
 
    
( ) ( )
1 1
( | )
N N
i i
i t t
i i
B B P y x
 
    
( , | ,1 )iP Y X i N AB                                              
(3) 
N denotes the number of appliances. Expectation 
Maximization algorithm (EM) is a common solution to 
estimate these parameters by using an auxiliary function until 
the convergence to a local maximum occurs. In our paper, we 
don’t adopt EM, instead, we take partial energy consumption 
data from all kinds of appliances as the training data trainY  and 
estimate the parameters by Maximum Likelihood Estimation. 
The process is shown in Table.2. 
Given a series of energy consumption data sumY from a 
smart meter, we can estimate all the appliances’ switch state 
sequences based on our FHMM model. With the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation, we can estimate all the appliances’ 
switch state sequences as follows:  
1 2... argmax ( , | )N sumX X X P Y X                                 (4) 
Here, argmax() represents the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation of related parameters in our FHMM model.  
As the hidden states of each appliance are easier to 
disclose user’s habits and behaviors, adding noise into the 
hidden states is more effective to preserve user’s privacy. 
Besides, noisy hidden state has better performance than the 
noisy energy consumption data in terms of data-utility. We 
show the detailed process in the next section. 
Table.2 Estimate the switch state by FHMM 
Algorithm1. Estimate the switch state by FHMM 
Input: 
trainY , sumY  
Output: The switch state sequences of each appliance 
(1) Input
trainY  into the FHMM as the training data. 
(2) Calculate the Maximum Likelihood Estimation of   
(3) Input 
sumY  
(4) Calculate the switch state sequences based on   
(5) Output switch states sequences 
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(a) Traditional noise addition scheme 
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(b) Our noise addition scheme 
Figure.6 The difference of noise addition between traditional scheme and ours 
E. Noise addition 
Definition.3. Local sensitivity 
For a mapping :
kf D R , in which kR denotes a k-
dimensional vector and D'  is an arbitrary adjacent dataset of 
D, the local sensitivity of f is  
1|| ( ) (D') ||maxf
D
LS f D f                                           (5) 
Definition.4. Smooth sensitivity 
For a mapping :
kf D R , in which kR denotes a k-
dimensional vector and D'  is an arbitrary adjacent dataset of 
D, the local sensitivity of f is  
| '|( ) max( ( ') )D DS D Ls D e   
                               (6) 
 
Theorem.1. For :
kf D R , the mechanism that adds noise 
with distribution ( / )Lap f   provides  -differential privacy. 
The theorem has been proved by Dwork [28]. In this 
paper, 
kR  represents the active power of all the appliances in a 
period of time. f represents the process of FHMM. =S(D)f  
and represents the maximum difference of the appliance’s 
switch states for the two adjacent datasets. 
After getting the switch state sequences of appliance i in 
time t, we add Laplace into the switch states of each appliance 
to generate the obfuscated switch state
( ) 'i tx . The detailed 
process can be expressed as follows: 
( ) ( )' ( ( ) / )i it tx x lap S D                                              (7) 
F. Data re-aggregation 
After we get the obfuscated switch state sequence, we 
can generate the obfuscated active power sequence based on 
the FHMM. While, considering the data-utility, we adjust the 
obfuscated active power as follows: 
( )
( )
1( )
( )
' 0
' 1
'
... ...
'
i
t
i
i t
t
i
w t
OFF x
ON x
x
ON x 



 

 
                                                 (8) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
y ' ' 0
' 0 ' 0
' ' 0
i i i i
t t t t
i i
t t
i i i
t t t
x x x
y x
CP x x x
   

 
   
                             (9) 
When 
( ) ( )'i it tx x and
( ) ' 0i tx  , the obfuscated active 
power based on FHMM is similar to the average value of the 
energy consumption data in total time slots. To reflect the real 
energy consumption, we take the original energy consumption 
data as the obfuscated active power in this time slot. 
When
( ) ' 0i tx  , theoretically, the obfuscated active power 
should be zero. However, as the relationship between the 
switch states and observed states is estimated by FHMM and 
may be nonzero when
( ) ' 0i tx  . Therefore, we set 
( ) ' 0i ty  in 
this situation. 
 
 
(a) Fridge 
 
(b) Washer dryer 
 
(c) Light 
 
(d) Microwave 
Figure.7 Energy consumption profile of each appliance 
In fact, the active power of an appliance is a little different 
even in the same switch state. When 
( ) ( )'i it tx x and
( ) ' 0i tx  , 
to reflect the real energy consumption, we take the value from 
the Consumption Profile (CP) whose switch state is equal to
( ) 'i tx  as our obfuscated active power. Figure.7 shows the 
energy consumption profiles of a fridge, a washer dryer, a light 
and a microwave, respectively. All these appliances have two 
or multiple states and the energy consumption dynamics are 
different even in the same operation mode. The final 
aggregated active power in time t can be calculated as follows: 
( )
1
' '
N
i
tt
i
y y

                                                                 (10) 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A.  Privacy analysis   
Theorem 2: Our scheme provides  -differential privacy. 
Proof: 
      The process of our scheme sumT can be expressed as follows: 
( ): FHMM iT Y x  
As the mapping bT  representing the FHMM can be 
regarded as a linier mapping approximately and | |E F
represent the number of different elements between E and F.  
We use sumT  to denote the process of FHMM which 
could be regarded as a combination of two sub-processes a
T
 
and b
T
. a
T
 represents the transformation from each 
appliance’s obfuscated switch states to the power consumption 
data. b
T
 represents the processes of data disaggregation. 
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Therefore, the process of FHMM can be seen as a combination 
1 2( ( ), ( )... ( ))sum b a a a nT T T X T X T X . 
1) According to the analysis by Dwork [26], adding 
Laplace noise into the original switch states provides   -
differential privacy. We use M to denote this process. 
2) As the map between appliances’ obfuscated switch 
states and the power consumption data is one to one.  
We use T to denote this process. 
( ) E E ET E A B  
( ) F F FT F A B  
, | , 0.If a A b B and a b e we have a b       
0if E F  , 
0E F    
0E FA A   
0E FB B   
( ) ( ) 0Therefore T E T F   
| ( ) ( ) | 1 | | .And T E T F E F     
Thus, the map T  is c-stable and the value of c is one. 
3) According to the property of c-stable, the 
transformation 
aT  which is equivalent to M T  provides  -
differential privacy. 
4) According to the combinability property of differential 
privacy, our scheme provides  -differential privacy. 
B. Utility analysis 
Definition.5. ( , )  -utility: 
For two datasets D, D'  which represent the original data 
and processed data, a randomized function Q satisfies ( , )   -
utility if it has the following property 
1Pr[||Q(D')-Q(D)|| ] 1                                           (11) 
Here,  represents the upper bound of distance between 
Q(D') and Q(D) . The smaller   is, the higher the level of 
data-utility will be achieved.  measures the probability 
1Pr[||Q(D')-Q(D)|| ] , and the probability of the distance 
between Q(D') and Q(D) below the upper bound increases 
when the value of  decreases. 
Theorem 3: our scheme satisfies ( , )   -utility. 
Proof: 
In this paper, D can be regarded as the real switch states 
of an appliance in different time slots. D'  can be regarded as 
the noisy switch states. Q represents the FHMM algorithm, 
which decides the mapping between the observed state and 
switch state. 
1) As the mapping between the observed state and switch 
state in the FHMM can be seen as a linear mapping, we have  
(D') D'Q k b                                                                (12) 
( )Q D kD b                                                                  (13) 
'D D D                                                                    (14) 
k and b are linear parameters and  represent the 
correction coefficient. 
2) Based on the above analysis and the property of norm, 
we have 
1 1
1
||Q(D')-Q(D)|| || (D' ) ||
|| ||
n
i
i
k D
k D k d
 
   
                             (15) 
3) As each noise ~ (0, )i
f
d laplace


 , the value of 
n
i
i
d will converge to zero when the value of n is large 
enough. Therefore, we have  
n
i
i
d                                                                         (16) 
1||Q(D')-Q(D)|| k                                                        (17) 
4) According to the above analysis, we have  
1Pr[||Q(D')-Q(D)|| ] 1k                                              (18) 
Therefore, our scheme is proved to satisfy ( ,0)k -utility. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section, we use F1-score [38] to measure the 
performance of our scheme in terms of the level of privacy-
preservation and adopt Kullback–Leibler divergence [45] to 
measure the level of data-utility based on the REDD data set 
[40] with the tool NILMTK [41]. Then, we compare our 
scheme with Barbosa’s scheme and Sankar’s scheme as 
follows. 
A. Privacy-preserving level of our scheme  
As we know, F1-score is an efficient metric to measure 
the level of privacy preservation, which can be regarded as a 
broadly accepted measuring tool for the accuracy of NILM F1-
score is widely used in NILM and completed in NILMTK [41].  
F1-score can be calculated as follows: 
2
1-score
Precision Recall
F
Precision Recall
 


                               (19)
 
Here, Precision and Recall represent the positive 
predictive value and the recall sensitivity respectively. They 
can be calculated as follows: 
100%
+F
P
P P
T
precision
T
                                           (20) 
100%P
P N
T
recall
T F
 

                                              (21)
 
PT  
represents the value of true positive which means the 
number of appliances that are correctly predicted to be on. 
PF  
represents the value of false positive which means the number 
of appliances that are wrongly predicted to be on. 
NF  
represents the value of false negative which means the number 
of appliances that are wrongly predicted to be off. When the 
F1-score goes high, the application usage patterns can be 
tracked more accurately. 
We adopt FHMM to estimate the switch states from the 
active power data obfuscated by Barbosa’s scheme, Sankar’s 
scheme and our scheme. The F1-scores of different schemes 
are shown in Figure.8.  
After the noise addition, the F1-score by NILM has fallen. 
We can find that the F1-score of our scheme is smaller than the 
other schemes, which means that our scheme has a stronger 
advantage resisting NILM. When the same noise is adding to 
the electricity consumption data, the F1-score of our scheme by 
NILM decreases greatly. So our scheme has a higher level of 
privacy preservation. 
 
Figure.8. The F1-scores of different schemes 
B. Data-utility of our scheme  
Kullback–Leibler divergence is a measure of how one 
probability distribution diverges from another expected 
probability distribution. The definition is shown as follows 
( )
( || ) ( ) log
( )i
P i
D P Q P i
Q i
                                            (22)
 
P represents the original discrete probability distribution 
and Q represents the fitting distribution. The larger the 
Kullback–Leibler divergence is, the larger the difference of the 
two distributions is. In this section, the original energy 
consumption data serves as P and the obfuscation data serves 
as Q. When the Kullback–Leibler divergence grows higher, the 
difference of original data and obfuscation data will grow 
higher as well, and the level of data-utility will become lower.  
At last, the multiple appliances’ energy consumption data 
processed by different schemes are shown in Figure.9. We 
could find directly that our scheme has a lower impact of data 
utility. 
We show the profiles of Kullback–Leibler divergence 
based on different  values in Figure.10. Through comparing 
those figures, we can find that the energy consumption profile 
processed by our scheme is very close to the original energy 
consumption profile. Besides, by observing the curves of 
Kullback–Leibler divergence in Figure.10, we can find that the 
Kullback–Leibler divergence decreases with the value of  
and our scheme’s Kullback–Leibler divergence is smaller than 
the Barbosa’s scheme and Sankar’s scheme. We take the value 
of ε  from the discrete set and calculate the 
Kullback–Leibler divergences of different schemes based on 
differentε . According to the property of Kullback–Leibler 
divergence, the Kullback–Leibler divergence will decrease 
when decreases and the scheme with a lower Kullback–
Leibler divergence provides a higher level of data-utility. 
Therefore, our scheme has an obvious advantage in data-utility. 
                           
(a) Original data of multiple applications                                                                         (b)Data obfuscated by Barbosa 
Fridge Light Microwave Washer dryer
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
F
1
-s
c
o
re
 
 
Our scheme
Sankar’s scheme
Barbosa’s scheme
FHMM without noise 
{0.1,1,5,10}

                           
(c)Data onfuscated by Sankar                                                                                       (d)Data obfuscated by our scheme 
Figure.9 Energy consumption profiles processed by different schemes (multiple appliances ε = 5) 
 
 
Figure.10. Kullback–Leibler divergence of different schemes 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving scheme 
based on the obfuscated switch states to realize the differential 
privacy towards fog computing in smart grid. We adopt the 
Factorial Hidden Markov Model to estimate the switch states 
of each appliance. Then, noise following Laplace distribution 
is added into the switch state to achieve the differential 
privacy. Based on the obfuscated switch states, we generate 
the obfuscated observed states and adjust them to guarantee 
the data-utility. Therefore, the appliance energy consumption 
patterns can be masked, even if the adversary can obtain the 
near real-time load profile. At last, we analyze the 
performance of our scheme, and compare it with other similar 
schemes in terms of the level of privacy-preserving (F1-score) 
and data-utility (Kullback–Leibler divergence). The security 
analysis and performance evaluation show that our scheme 
provides a better utility-privacy tradeoff. In the future, we will 
focus on extending the FHMM to further preserve user’s 
privacy without compromising the data-utility. In addition, the 
limitation of the FHMM algorithm is its high computational 
cost. We will try to design the lightweight FHMM based 
method that is suitable for fog clients. 
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